Credit default swaps and financial stability: risks and regulatory issues. by Duquerroy, A. et al.
Banque de France ￿ Financial Stability Review ￿ No. 13 – The future of ﬁ  nancial regulation ￿ September 2009  75
Credit default swaps and ﬁ  nancial stability:
risks and regulatory issues
The credit default swap (CDS) market has grown much faster than other derivatives markets since its 
inception. Even though it is dwarfed by the interest rate derivatives market, which is eight times larger, its 
growth has affected the stability of the ﬁ  nancial system. CDS were originally designed as a risk transfer 
tool to allow investors to hedge their position in the debt of a reference entity, but much of the activity in 
this market is also speculative (Olléon-Assouan, 2004).
Risk management in the CDS market has certainly improved signiﬁ  cantly, reﬂ  ected in the fact that gross 
notional volumes have fallen remarkably as a result of trade compression. Nevertheless there is still no 
accurate indication of how much risk has actually been transferred with these instruments, and this is a 
major concern for ﬁ  nancial stability. Even a rough estimate of market size ranges from USD 29 trillion to 
USD 38 trillion at end-2008. 
Clarifying and harmonising information is vitally important, particularly since the uncertainty surrounding 
market participants’ risk exposure contains the seeds of systemic contagion. There is now a pressing need 
for better market supervision based on the active participation of regulators. The task has already been 
made easier by a number of public and private initiatives aimed at improving the functioning of the market 
and monitoring risks more effectively. The most tangible evidence of these combined efforts can be found 
in various plans for a clearinghouse that emerged in 2008 and 2009. Aside from its practical limitations, 
however, this solution cannot be extended to all CDS classes. And regulators still face the sizeable challenge 
of assessing overall counterparty risk on the CDS market and preventing concentration and formation of 
systemic exposures.
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1| A  NON-TRANSPARENT, 
  COMPLEX MARKET
1|1  Estimating the size of the market
DATA SOURCES
There are three main data providers, each 
with its own collection process (see Table 1). 
Comparing the data is not an easy process because 
its scope (products, number of reporting institutions, 
geographies, etc.) and used deﬁ  nitions vary from 
one institution to another. For comparison, the latest 
data from the International Swaps and Derivatives 
Association (ISDA), taken from the April 2009 
market survey, estimated the CDS market at 
USD 38.6 trillion at end-2008, while the Depository 
Trust & Clearing Corporation (DTCC) gives a ﬁ  gure of 
USD 29 trillion (Table 1). Harmonising and clarifying 
this information are therefore key issues.
DEFINITIONS
One key issue for supervisors is to measure exposure. 
Several deﬁ  nitions are used when collecting data, 
each of which has its advantages and limitations. 
For example gross volume is an indicator of changes 
in market activity. But because the CDS market 
trades over-the-counter (OTC) and is therefore not 
standardised, contracts are not perfectly fungible 
and lack liquidity. Hence participants have to 
multiply their positions to increase or decrease their 
exposure. Accordingly, gross volume data result 
from a mass of trades and provide no information 
that can be used to assess position risk. However, 
the data concerning types of counterparties 
and reference entities are useful for analysing 
systemic risk.
The net amounts identiﬁ  ed by DTCC are the sum 
of each counterparty’s net long and short positions 
on a particular reference entity. They correspond 
to the maximum possible funds transfers between 
protection buyers and sellers if an issuer defaults, 
assuming a zero recovery rate and no collateral.
Table 1
Main sources of global data on the CDS market
BIS ISDA DTCC – TIW *
Start date for CDS reporting December 2004 June 2001 October 2008
Frequency Half-yearly Half-yearly Weekly
Scope  56 dealers  78 reporters, ISDA members 
(primary members)
All trades conﬁ  rmed in DTCC 
Deriv/SERV (24 major dealers + 
buy side ﬁ  rms)
Estimated coverage as % of 
trades’ number: 
95% (DTCC) - 75% (IMF)
Geography G10 21 countries World
Type of data  – Gross notional amounts 
of CDS bought and sold, 
before bilateral netting
– Gross market value
Gross notional amounts – Gross notional amounts 
of CDS bought and sold 
– Net notional positions 
per reference entity
Estimated market size (USD trn)
June 2008  57 54.6 N/A
December 2008 41 38.6 29
N/A: Non available.
* DTCC estimates that it covers 95% of all transactions on the CDS market (in number of contracts). The IMF has lowered that estimate to 75% because past transactions 
are not recorded; neither are bespoke trades. which are not conﬁ  rmed electronically.
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The only metric that allows a true assessment of 
counterparty risk in CDS is the market value of 
contracts. This is because risk exposure varies 
according to a contract’s market value after bilateral 
netting (not just on CDS positions but across all OTC 
derivatives positions covered by the same Master 
Agreement with a counterparty), multilateral netting 
through a trade compression cycle and collateralisation.
1|2 Recent  developments
A MORE SMOOTHLY FUNCTIONING MARKET
The measurement of risk actually transferred 
through CDS must be put into perspective. Market 
participants now beneﬁ  t from a range of mechanisms 
that have helped improve the management of 
operational risk and make transactions more secure. 
Owing to a number of private, regulator-backed 
initiatives the CDS market place has become one of 
the most highly automated OTC markets.
Since 2005 the industry has been seeking to solve   
the problem of operational risk arising from 
conﬁ  rmation backlogs. With the implementation 
of DTCC’s electronic platform, Deriv/SERV, trades 
are now automated and conﬁ  rmed electronically. 
These initiatives have reduced the volume of 
outstanding conﬁ  rmations by 75% since 2005 and cut 
conﬁ  rmation times from several weeks to a few days.
Trade conﬁ  rmation facilitated by novation 
Another factor contributing to the market 
improvements was the introduction in 2005 of 
the ISDA Novation protocol, which sets precise 
deadlines for getting counterparty consent for 
novation. In economics, novation is a process 
whereby a CDS counterparty transfers its obligations 
under the contract to another entity. If the novation 
is not conﬁ  rmed, validation of the transaction is 
delayed. In such situations, both operational risk 
and counterparty risk increase because the investor 
cannot be informed that its CDS obligations have 
been transferred to the new entity. Under the 
ISDA protocol the counterparty must give its 
consent via an electronic conﬁ  rmation  process 
before the contract is transferred to the new entity.
A standardised auction procedure has improved 
the efﬁ  ciency of credit event settlement 
Following the collapse of several carmakers and 
airlines, market participants introduced in 2005 a 
standardised auction procedure under the umbrella 
of ISDA to deal with the default of reference entities 
with a volume of underlying debt smaller than 
the notional value of their CDS. The amount of 
protection on certain ﬁ  rms in these sectors was much 
larger than the deliverable assets needed in case of 
physical settlement. And because some of these CDS 
were index components, a single recovery rate was 
necessary to ensure that all investors with a position 
on an index would be treated equally. With the 
current auction process, all investors can take part 
and choose between physical and cash settlement. 
The process determines a single ﬁ  nal price, which 
is then applied to all cash-settled investors. Since 
March 2009 the market has taken a step towards 
greater standardisation of settlement procedures 
by incorporating the auction method into the ISDA 
deﬁ  nitions. The method is retroactively applied to 
existing contracts (“Big Bang Protocol”).
Eliminating redundant contracts through compression 
cycles
Used extensively by investors in 2008 the 
compression process consists in eliminating 
positions that can be multilaterally netted from 
the portfolios of several dealers, replacing them 
with a smaller number of contracts with the same 
net residual exposure. The current contraction in 
market size can be attributed to private initiatives 
to compress portfolios. TriOptima, the leading 
supplier of compression services, announced 
that it compressed USD 30.2 trillion of CDS 
contracts in 2008. Going forward, however, the 
potential effects of compression will be limited 
by the lack of standardisation in the CDS market. 
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Source: DTCC, 5 May 2009.
1  Credit default tranche: tranche of standardised CDO linked to a CDS index. 
A CDT replicates the behaviour of unfunded synthetic CDO tranches with 
a reference portfolio composed of the reference entities in the index basket 
(Cousseran and Rahmouni, 2005).
In sum, the net overall exposure, i.e. the maximum 
amount payable by protection sellers, currently 
stands at USD 2.5 trillion, or 9% of the gross 
notional amount. 
Credit event settlement has been smooth, and risk exposure 
in the CDS market should be reassessed in light of the 
amounts transferred
A number of lessons have been learned from a 
steady string of credit events since the onset of 
the crisis, with 10 credit events settled via auctions 
in 2008 and 21 in the ﬁ  rst four months of 2009. 
These lessons apply both to the exposure of 
market participants and to the resilience and 
robustness – at least from a technical perspective 
– of the CDS market.
The Lehman Brothers default illustrated the problems 
caused by the lack of information available to individual 
participants before a credit event occurs. Initial 
media estimates suggested that total gross insurance 
claims would amount to USD 400 billion, much 
higher than Lehman’s bond debt of USD 150 billion 
or less. But preliminary estimates from ISDA, based 
on the auction, give a net ﬁ  gure of USD 7 billion 
only. According to DTCC, USD 72 billion in CDS 
was settled normally through the automatic 
settlement procedure on 21 October 2008, without 
incident. This made it possible to calculate the 
funds transferred from net protection sellers to net 
protection buyers at just USD 5.2 billion, or 7% of the 
notional amount. As a result, fears of serial default 
among protection sellers unable to settle their claims 
proved baseless. 
Broadly, looking at the auctions held since the crisis 
began, it can be seen that funds transfers arising 
from reference entity defaults have been fairly small. 
According to DTCC data, the ratio of gross notional 
CDS amounts to net funds transfers has rarely topped 
10% (Table 2). 
WITH HINDSIGHT, HOW HAS RISK MATERIALISED?
Market size must be reassessed and risk should be 
evaluated in light of net notional volumes
Recent trends suggest that the size of the market in 
gross volume terms should be assessed in broader 
perspective. Extensive use of portfolio compression 
by market participants, for instance, has sharply 
reduced total gross notional outstandings in CDS from 
USD 57 trillion in June 2008 (BIS) to USD 27.7 trillion 
in early May 2008 (DTCC).
Understandably, the reduction has been more 
signiﬁ   cant for multi-name contracts (indices, 
baskets) than for single-name CDS. Since multi-name 
CDS include contracts linked to indices, which are 
standardised and therefore automatically permit 
more efﬁ  cient netting, compression cycles are likely 
to have a greater effect in this segment.
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Table 2
Most recent CDS credit events
CDS/CDX/CDT Events








Single Name and index 15 October 2008 99 billion 0.43 billion
Lehman Bros. Inc. Single Name 21 October 2008 72 billion 5.2 billion
Washington Mutual  Single Name 7 November 2008 41 billion 1.4 billion
Landsbanki, Glitnir, 
Kaupthing
Single Name 20 November 2008 71 billion 4.65 billion
Tribune Company Single Name, Index 16 January 2009 24.9 billion 2.65 billion




Single Name, Index 10 February 2009 7.8 billion 0.45 billion
Nortel Networks Single Name, Index 18 February 2009 5.6 billion 0.52 billion
Smurﬁ  t Single Name, Index 26 February 2009 4.3 billion 0.44 billion
Furthermore the credit events that occurred in 2008 
and 2009 were handled smoothly, thus demonstrating 
the efﬁ   ciency of the auction protocols, with a 
participation rate in excess of 95%.
The volatility of CDS premia during the crisis has affected 
risk assessment on other markets
The reason for the market’s rapid expansion is 
that CDS, like all derivatives, are not used solely 
for hedging purposes; investors also use them as 
trading instruments and hold them in the trading 
book. Transactions aimed at generating a direct proﬁ  t 
from trading strategies are partly responsible for the 
liquidity of this market and also its volatility. This is 
signiﬁ  cant because movements in the CDS market 
are not without consequence: when CDS premia 
ﬂ  uctuate, market participants revisit their default 
probability expectations for reference entities. 
The recent sharp rise in sovereign CDS premia 
in Europe, the United States and Japan is likely 
to produce default probabilities that bear little 
relation to these countries’ economic fundamentals 
(Box  1). Likewise, changes in CDS premia will 
probably impact a broader range of ﬁ  nancial asset 
prices because of the relationship between the CDS 
market and other markets. Transfers of information 
between the CDS market and its underlying market 
can affect corporate ﬁ   nancing conditions and, 
more broadly, the entire economy. And since CDS 
are seen as yardsticks for measuring companies’ 
ﬁ  nancial strength, they are used in some asset 
pricing models. For instance, market participants 
concur that CDS may have been purchased to get 
around the restrictions on short selling introduced 
by supervisors in some countries.
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Box 1
Challenges for ﬁ  nancial stability: the European sovereign CDS market
Emergence of the market in the aftermath of Lehman Brothers
Between early 2008 and end-September 2008 the CDS of the highest-rated and reputedly safest countries, including 
Germany and France, traded at a premium of several basis points. Premia for lower rated countries such as Greece, Spain 
and Italy amounted to some tens of basis points.
Following the collapse of Lehman Brothers most developed countries introduced plans to shore up their ﬁ  nancial systems. 
As a result of these programmes, which consisted in taking stakes in the largest ailing banks or guaranteeing some of their 
liabilities, risk was transferred from the banking industry to governments. This prompted market participants to review their 
expectations for sovereign default probability. The premia on these countries’ CDS soared, creating fresh opportunities in 
a market that had not been actively traded so far.
How will sovereign CDS trading affect the credit market?
To take advantage of the rise in sovereign CDS premia, the major banks that normally trade credit derivatives have devised 
directional or relative value strategies. Some have set up trading desks to deal speciﬁ  cally with this market segment. 
Although this activity has been responsible for most of the trading ﬂ  ows observed to date, sovereign CDS are also being 
used either to hedge some of the economic risk on debt portfolios on a speciﬁ  c country (i.e. macrohedging) or to build 
bespoke structured products incorporating developed country sovereign debt.
The emergence of the developed sovereign CDS market has implications for the economy as a whole. CDS are seen as a 
bellwether for risk pricing, and the correlation between sovereign CDS premia rose sharply post-Lehman to reach a level 
comparable to that between the premia on bank CDS. This reﬂ  ects a disconnect between the market and the economic 
fundamentals of each developed country, which differ structurally. So although notional CDS volumes are small in relation 
to sovereign debt, the increase in sovereign risk – and hence systemic risk – evidenced in CDS premia affects the ﬁ  nancing 
of the economy and sends out a negative signal for the future ratings of developed countries.
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1|3  Special challenges for ﬁ  nancial 
  stability: potential systemic risk
Due to advances in the management of operational 
risk, the credit derivatives market is now better 
able to withstand a crisis-hit environment marked 
by frequent and regular credit events. But there 
are still several types of risk, closely linked to the 
occurrence and management of counterparty risk, 
that are a source of weakness with potential systemic 
repercussions.
COUNTERPARTY RISK AND THE LIMITS OF 
COLLATERALISATION
Counterparty risk – the risk that one of the two 
parties to a transaction will default – is the focal point 
of attention on the CDS market, as it is on all OTC 
markets. With a CDS, a protection seller is exposed 
to the risk that the protection buyer will not fulﬁ  l its 
commitment to pay the pre-agreed premium regularly 
until the contract matures. A protection buyer risks 
losing the protection it has purchased and being 
forced to replace it at a certain cost. Counterparty 
risk is therefore assessed on the replacement cost 
of a contract with a positive market value. It varies 
according to the market value of the premium and 
the maturity of the contract, and it declines with the 
number of outstanding payments. 
Market participants actively manage counterparty 
risk by exchanging collateral. The purpose of these 
collateralisation practices is to cover one party’s net 
residual exposure to the other party, thereby reducing 
the loss sustained in the event of default. More than 
80% of the collateral received and delivered in the 
OTC derivatives market is cash1. The non-defaulting 
counterparty can use the collateral to replace its 
position. In practice, market participants manage 
the counterparty risk on their entire OTC derivatives 
portfolio according to their aggregate position on a 
speciﬁ  c counterparty. Collateralisation practices seem 
to function satisfactorily on the whole, as reﬂ  ected 
in the reduction in funds transfers arising from the 
credit events occurring in 2008 and 2009 (Table 2). 
That said, efﬁ  cient management of counterparty risk 
is undermined by three sources of risk.
 
1  See ISDA Margin Survey 2009.
2 ibid.
Collateralisation practices are still incomplete and uneven
While almost all inter-dealer trades are collateralised, 
this is not the case for transactions between dealers 
and non-dealers. According to ISDA2, 66% of credit 
derivatives exposures are covered by collateral. 
Although the percentage of collateralised exposures 
has risen signiﬁ  cantly since 2004, when it stood at 
39%, it did not increase in 2008 despite the crisis. 
Unsecured thresholds (the amount above which 
collateral has to be posted) cannot be the only reason 
why one-third of exposures are not covered. Some 
highly-rated entities still do not post collateral. This 
has been the case for monoline insurers, and is still 
the case for some of them despite a decline in their 
solvency and hence their ratings.
 
Margin calls cannot cover jumps to default
The process of managing and calibrating margin 
calls for CDS can be hindered by speciﬁ  c risks. 
It is extremely difﬁ  cult to capture and mitigate 
counterparty risk effectively through CDS collateral 
calls in the run-up to default. A credit event is 
preceded by a so-called jump to default, that is to 
say a sudden spike in the CDS premium and thus the 
market value of the contract. Chart 2 illustrates this 
phenomenon, which is speciﬁ  c to the CDS market. 
In such cases, it is highly likely that the level of 
Chart 2
Jump to default























Up-front price of protection
Auction-determined payout
Source: Moody’s CreditQuotes.
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collateral will be too low to cushion the rise, and 
the protection buyer will not have time to adjust its 
margin call. Despite collateralisation, therefore, a 
protection buyer can still incur substantial losses if 
its selling counterparty defaults.
Counterparty risk can turn into liquidity risk
The procyclical nature of margin calls based on rating 
triggers has highlighted the limitations of some of the 
practices used to manage counterparty risk. Increasing 
a collateral call on a downgraded counterparty can 
spark a liquidity crisis and weaken the struggling 
entity, possibly driving it to default. For example even 
though AIG, as a triple-A rated counterparty, was 
originally not required to collateralise its positions, 
it was called  on signiﬁ  cant margin calls after being 
downgraded. Between September and December 2008 
AIG FP paid a total of USD 22.4 billion in margin to 
its 20 biggest counterparties. That said, rating triggers 
are not conﬁ  ned to CDS and are fairly infrequent in 
this market. They are generally used when arranging 
structured products, chieﬂ  y in the United States and 
only infrequently in Europe. 
FROM COUNTERPARTY RISK TO SYSTEMIC RISK: 
CONCENTRATION AND CORRELATION
The very high level of concentration that is 
characteristic of the CDS market, combined with a 
higher risk of correlation between the protection 
seller and the underlying entity, transform the 
shortcomings of counterparty risk management into 
a potential systemic risk.
Concentration calls into question whether risk is actually 
transferred
Market concentration has increased following the 
default of ﬁ  nancial entities active in CDS trading, such 
as Lehman Brothers, along with the near-bankruptcy 
of AIG, the disappearance of key players like 
Bear Stearns and the exit of numerous hedge funds. 
In terms of systemic risk, two issues arise: the 
increase in counterparty risk and the extent to which 
credit risk has actually been transferred. The credit 
risk still haunts the ﬁ  nancial system and therefore 
the banking system. 
The 10 largest dealers now account for 90% of trading 
volume by gross notional amounts, compared with 
less than 75% in 2004. Concentration is even higher 
in the US market, where the ﬁ  ve biggest commercial 
banks account for more than 97% of gross notionals 
(30% of global activity is generated by JPMorgan).3 
Wrong way risk – i.e. risk arising from a dealer selling 
protection to a reference entity with which it is closely 
correlated – also increases the risk of serial default
Although risk remains within the ﬁ  nancial sector, 
the protection sold by market participants relates 
to that very sector. At 1st May 2009 nearly 40% of 
gross outstandings in single-name CDS concerned 
reference entities in the ﬁ  nancial sector (Chart 3). 
3  Data at Q4 2008, Ofﬁ  ce of the Comptroller of the Currency – JPMorgan Chase, BoA, Citibank, Goldman Sachs, HSBC Bank USA.
Chart 3
Gross notional amounts














Source: DTCC, 1st May 2009.
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Table 3
Top 10 reference entities by net protection amounts 
Net USD billions
General Electric Capital Corporation 11.07
Deutsche Bank Aktiengesellschaft 7.16
Bank of America Corporation 6.80
Morgan Stanley 6.32
The Goldman Sachs Group, inc. 5.21
Merrill Lynch & Co., inc. 5.15
Berkshire Hathaway inc. 4.63
Barclays Bank PLC 4.36
UBS AG 4.31
The Royal Bank of Scotland Public 
Limited Company 4.27
Source: DTCC, 1st May 2009.
There is a signiﬁ  cant risk of double default, that 
is, the default of an entity that is both an active 
counterparty on the market and a CDS underlier. 
In terms of net notional amounts, i.e. the maximum 
amount at risk,4 seven dealers are among the top ten 
reference entities (Table 3).
Instead of redistributing credit risks, CDS have 
actually contributed to intensifying systemic risk 
by concentrating exposure on a handful of highly 
interconnected players that are simultaneously 
buyers, sellers and underliers. This has spawned a 
new type of risk, “too interconnected to fail”, which has 
superseded “too big to fail” risk (Brunnermeier, 2008).
These observations underscore the need to upgrade 
the operational management of counterparty 
risk, which will be achieved partly by setting up 
clearinghouses for the credit derivatives market, 
and to increase market transparency. The aim is to 
improve the assessment of counterparty risk, in the 
interest not only of regulators but also of market 
participants. 
2| MAKING CREDIT DERIVATIVES 
  MARKETS MORE RESILIENT
2|1 Extending  central  counterparty 
  clearing to credit derivatives
The debate over extending central counterparty 
clearing to OTC derivatives is not new.5 But the 
problems encountered in CDS markets during the 
ﬁ  nancial crisis have prompted US and European 
regulators, notably within the G20, to speed up the 
extension process. Clearing infrastructures have 
responded positively to these requests. In the course 
of 2008 the managers of ﬁ  ve clearing infrastructures 
(two in the United States and three in Europe, 
including two in the euro area) unveiled plans to 
provide services for these products.6 
EXPECTED BENEFITS
Central counterparty clearing is a mechanism for 
absorbing the credit risk and market risk generated 
by trades in capital markets.7 The clearinghouse, 
acting as a central counterparty (CCP), guarantees the 
fulﬁ  lment of its members’ transactions. Its action can 
be critical if a member defaults, because it will stand in 
for the defaulter and ensure that the ﬁ  rm’s obligations 
to other counterparties are honoured. In this case the 
CCP continues to pay premiums to the protection 
seller and to protect the protection buyer against 
the underlying credit risk of the contract until it can 
liquidate the position. The surviving counterparties 
are not therefore required to bear the cost of replacing 
their position – which would expose them to market 
risk – since that risk is absorbed by the CCP.
The CCP reduces the aggregate level of risk associated 
with all the positions in the market by systematically 
4  Maximum possible funds transfers if the reference entity defaults, assuming a zero recovery rate and no collateral.
5  See Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (2007).
6  See Appendix: summary of CDS clearing projects.
7  It should be noted that setting up central counterparty clearing for credit derivatives does not involve bringing these products onto organised markets (or “exchanges”). 
Clearing through central counterparties has traditionally been associated with organised markets, and in particular with derivatives markets, this being one of the 
criteria distinguishing them from OTC markets. Since the 1990s, however, central counterparty services have been developed for OTC trades, including derivatives 
such as interest rate swaps and products traded in the cash market, such as government bond repos. In contrast with organised markets, trading in such products 
remains decentralised and is carried out on a bilateral basis between market intermediaries. But once a trade is complete, the counterparties elect to go through a 
central counterparty, enabling them to manage their mutual default risks more effectively.
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netting positions8 in fungible contracts. Compared 
with maintaining the bilateral relationships between 
the initial counterparties, the CCP facilitates novation 
by providing a single, predictable legal framework 
that is accepted in advance by all users.
Setting up a CCP involves extending collateralisation 
practices to all the positions it covers. A core condition 
for the efﬁ  ciency of a CCP is to receive adequate 
guarantees, whose amount is adjusted frequently 
to reﬂ  ect changes in its exposure to members. In 
practice, CCPs accomplish this by performing margin 
calls at least once a day, possibly supplemented by 
intraday variation margin calls if their exposure to 
a member deteriorates.9 Moreover, CCPs beneﬁ  t 
from additional sources of collateral  provided by 
a risks mutualisation mechanism set up among the 
members. This takes the form of a clearing fund, 
which is activated if the individual collateral posted 
by the defaulting member proves insufﬁ  cient.10
CENTRAL COUNTERPARTY CLEARING FOR CREDIT 
DERIVATIVES: CONDITIONS AND LIMITATIONS
The capacity of a CCP to absorb the shock generated 
by a member’s failure hinges on the quality of 
its risk management systems. The current lack 
of standardisation among credit derivatives is 
hampering the extension of central counterparty 
clearing to all categories of CDS. Moreover CCPs will 
have to adapt their risk management frameworks in 
order to accommodate the particular risk proﬁ  le of 
these contracts.
Extending central counterparty clearing to CDS is hampered 
by a lack of contract standardisation
The varying level of standardisation in credit 
derivatives limits the range of CCP-eligible products. 
The only credit derivatives covered by ongoing CCP 
projects are those that are sufﬁ  ciently standardised. 
They include CDS index products, and potentially 
the most liquid single-name CDS, basically contracts 
on the reference entities making up the index. 
Standardisation is key to coping effectively with 
legal risk. The CCP must be able to measure the 
nature and scope of the obligations it guarantees. 
The degree to which products are standardised will 
determine their fungibility and hence the CCP’s 
capacity to reduce its exposure to members by netting 
their positions. Standardisation also increases the 
liquidity of the products cleared, making it simpler 
for a CCP to manage a default because positions can 
be hedged or unwound more easily.
Accommodating the special risk proﬁ  le of CDS
The special risk proﬁ  le of CDS calls for signiﬁ  cant 
adaptations  in the usual methods used by CCPs to 
manage risk. The methods for calculating margin 
calls, as well as the stress tests used to calculate the 
size of the clearing funds set up by clearinghouse 
members, need to factor in jump to default risk (see 
above), which is not present in the other types of 
derivatives usually cleared by CCPs. 
Another difﬁ  cult challenge is to incorporate wrong 
way risk. For this the clearinghouse has to determine 
the amount of collateral needed to cover not only 
its own counterparty risk on members but also the 
underlying credit risk in the contracts on which a 
failed member has sold protection. If a member’s 
credit risk is closely correlated with that of the 
reference entities on which it has sold protection, 
the CCP may have to deal simultaneously with the 
failure of the member and a credit event triggered 
by contracts on the same member as well as on a 
reference entity with risk correlated to that of the 
defaulting member. Given the special nature of the 
risks involved in clearing credit derivatives, it would 
seem that the risk management systems used for these 
products should be kept separate from the systems 
that handle other market segments cleared by the 
same CCP. In this respect, a separate clearing fund for 
credit derivatives is essential for limiting the risk of 
contagion between the failure of a member active in 
credit derivatives markets and other members of the 
CCP that do not necessarily deal in these markets.
The access of CCPs to liquidity: a crucial issue
A CCP’s access to liquidity is an essential part of 
its default management system. The clearinghouse 
must have sufﬁ  cient resources to cope with a sudden 
increase in its needs so that it can carry the defaulting 
member’s positions until they can be liquidated. 
8 See  Dufﬁ  e (2008).
9  See Wendt (2006).
10  Note that when Lehman Brothers failed, none of the G10 CCPs involved in its positions needed to draw on their clearing funds.
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Access to central bank money and intraday and 
overnight credit with the central bank greatly reduces 
the CCP’s dependence on bank reﬁ  nancing lines, 
which are likely to dry up when money markets 
are under strain. Indeed the constant policy of the 
Eurosystem, which requires clearinghouses dealing 
in the euro to be located in the euro area, is based 
on the need to ensure that CCPs have direct access 
to central bank credit operations and that central 
banks can effectively supervise CCPs. 
2|2  Challenges for regulators
HARMONISING CCP SUPERVISION
The speciﬁ  c risks posed by clearing credit derivatives 
are not entirely addressed by existing international 
standards for managing clearinghouse risk. The G10 
recommendations on CCPs, published jointly in 2004 
by the Committee on Payment and Settlement 
Systems and the International Organisation of 
Securities Commissions make no distinctions based 
on the type of product cleared. Consequently the 
risks speciﬁ  c to OTC derivatives – in particular the 
special risks associated with credit derivatives, as 
described above – are not taken into account.
The standards applicable to CCPs that clear CDS 
need to be adapted and harmonised to ensure that 
the solutions now being developped are robust and 
that competing CCPs beneﬁ  t from a level-playing 
ﬁ  eld. Work in this area is currently under way at 
European level11 and in the G10, and is due to be 
completed by end of 2009.
CCPs that clear CDS are likely to become highly 
interdependent, not only because they all use 
common infrastructures such as the DTCC’s Trade 
Information Warehouse but also because a given 
participant can potentially participate in several 
clearinghouses. In view of this interdependency, 
a cooperation framework needs to be put in place 
for the authorities responsible for overseeing CCPs, 
as well as for those that supervise clearinghouse 
members. Such cooperation is also necessary so that 
these authorities can access DTCC data. 
SUPPORTING INITIATIVES FOR MORE EFFECTIVE 
REGULATION OF CREDIT DERIVATIVES MARKETS 
Since the CDS market is not regulated it is important 
for regulators to foster private initiatives aimed at 
improving transparency. It is also necessary to support 
such initiatives and make sure they contribute to the 
ultimate objective of ﬁ  nancial stability.
European regulators currently face three major 
challenges:
Establishing adequate incentives to promote the use of CCPs
Competent authorities should adopt policies that 
encourage market participants to clear CDS via a 
CCP. The alternative – imposing prudential penalties 
on CDS that do not pass through a CCP – does not 
seem feasible given that a large number of contracts 
are not currently eligible for central clearing due 
to a lack of standardisation and liquidity. The only 
products eligible for clearing in the projects launched 
so far are indices, because they trade on the basis 
of ﬁ  xed coupons. Discussions under way at the 
European Commission should generate proposals 
for incentives by the end of 2009.
Assessing counterparty risk in the CDS market: the need 
for greater transparency 
The AIG and Lehman Brothers affairs have 
highlighted the need for greater transparency to 
help market participants assess counterparty risk 
in the CDS market. The type of information needed 
depends on the end user. The needs of regulators are 
dictated by the imperative of preventing systemic 
risk, while the needs of market participants reﬂ  ect a 
tradeoff between gaining a ﬁ  ner-grained assessment 
of counterparty risk and protecting the conﬁ  dentiality 
of their strategies and thus their transactions. 
Since counterparty risk cannot be assessed at 
aggregate level, regulators need to know the 
individual bilateral commitments of the various 
dealers so that they can detect and prevent systemic 
exposures. It is less easy to determine the extent to 
which this type of information should be disclosed 
to market participants. 
11  The ESCB and the Committee of European Securities Regulators are working together to adapt CPSS-IOSCO recommendations on CCPs and settlement systems at 
EU level. They have amended their draft report to incorporate the speciﬁ  c aspects of clearing OTC credit derivatives.
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Box 2
Standardisation of North American contracts: 
consequences for the market and issues for European regulators
The new contract for CDS on North American reference entities, developed by ISDA at the behest of the major US dealers, 
entered into force in April 2009. It involves two major changes in market practices: 
• Like CDS indices, single name CDS under the new contract trade at ﬁ  xed coupons of 100 bps (for investment grade) 
and 500 bps (for speculative grade) instead of running spread equal to the market value of the spread on the contract 
origination date. An up-front fee is paid to compensate for the present value of the difference between the ﬁ  xed coupon 
and the market spread.
• Debt restructuring is no longer recognised as a credit event.
Consequences for the market
• The new contract is better suited to trading needs. Standard coupons make the contracts more fungible and facilitate the 
netting of positions between contracts signed on different dates. As a result, market liquidity should improve.
• These are basically the standardised contracts that will be cleared by CCPs.
Issues for European regulators
• In Europe, the new contract is less well suited to the use of CDS as hedging instruments, because of the prudential 
treatment of CDS that do not include a restructuring clause. Without that clause, only 60% of the amount of a purchased 
CDS is recognised as a risk mitigant under Basel II, compared with 100% with the restructuring clause. 
• European banks have to choose between the capital relief associated with the old contract and the advantages of CCP 
clearing if they adopt the new contract. The key issue for European regulators, therefore, is to decide on the prudential 
treatment of CDS.
Aside from knowledge of the actual amounts 
exposed, better information about collateralisation 
practices can provide a more accurate framework 
for assessing the magnitude of counterparty risk. 
Other useful information includes the identity of 
uncollateralised counterparties, unsecured threshold 
amounts, and the number of transactions covered by 
collateral agreements.
Supporting standardisation efforts undertaken by private 
parties under the purview of ISDA
Until now the impetus for formalising and 
harmonising the procedures and deﬁ  nitions used 
by market participants has come from ISDA, whose 
legal documentation has become the industry 
standard. 
Recent efforts to standardise contracts should be 
encouraged, since standardisation is necessary for 
netting purposes. However, in its new standard 
contract for North American reference entities, 
ISDA has chosen not to include restructuring as a 
credit event. This raises a prudential issue (Box 2). 
Furthermore, the restructuring clause makes 
protection more comprehensive in countries where 
bankruptcy law does not offer the same possibilities 
as the Chapter 11 procedure in the United States. 
While the clause is complicated to trigger and has 
rarely been activated in the past, its usefulness in 
a credit cycle characterised by an unprecedented 
rise in bankruptcies should not be underestimated. 
As market standards evolve, one issue that arises is 
the tradeoff between standardising a contract and 
ensuring that it is exhaustive – an issue that should 
not be neglected by the regulator. Regulators should 
certainly ensure that the interests of dealers are 
represented, a task amply discharged by ISDA, but 
they should also consider the interests of participants 
on the buy side.
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APPENDIX
















on 22 December 2008
EUREX
Germany




Due to launch 
at end H2 2009












– Citadel (US hedge 
fund)
NYSE Euronext in 
partnership with LCH.
Clearnet Ltd (London)
based on the BClear 
derivatives trading 
platform operated by 
Liffe (London). 
– EUREX Clearing: 
joint subsidiary 
of Deutsche Börse 
and SWX Swiss 
Exchange
LCH.Clearnet SA
Products  – US indices (CDX) 
at inception
– US indices (CDX) 
at inception
– European indices 
(iTraxx) at inception
– European indices 
(iTraxx) at inception




Cleared 613 trades 
with a face value of 
USD 71 billion in the 
ﬁ  rst month
Plans to launch ICE 
Clear Europe
Plans to launch FX 
clearing
No transactions
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